

Exit, voice, and loyalty: Contentious urbanization in Accra and Nairobi

Jacqueline M. Klopp and Jeffrey W. Paller

Africa is experiencing rapid urbanization; demographics are shifting the continent from a rural to a primarily urban continent (Parnell and Pieterse 2014). The implications of this urban transition for politics constitute a critical emerging research agenda. Cities as arenas of political contention around urbanization itself—with its diverse flows of people and ideas, are increasingly important to study. Urbanization, of course, is not new, and African cities have long histories of contentious urbanization that involve skewed land allocation, invasions and squatting, immigrant and population expulsions, demolitions, exclusive urban planning and the formation of parallel governance structures. But the history is also one of creativity, cooperation and new forms of livelihoods, living, identity and political dialogues, forms, and debates.

All too often urbanization is understood to be an abstract linear process of people being born into or moving to urban areas. The increase in people living in urban areas—the basic definition of urbanization—is often associated with economic modernization, industrialization, and societal rationalization. Conventional wisdom suggests that as more people live in cities than rural areas, societies become more educated, prosperous, and cosmopolitan; further, that the proximity and interactions of city living are conducive of democratic politics (Lowe 2014). This is because urbanization is also expected to have significant political effects, contributing to greater liberalism, tolerance and democratization. When these results are not realized, this is sometimes explained by societies having deviated from the equilibrium path, or not being far enough along on the process of urbanization.

We take issue with this linear and more structural understanding of urbanization, due to its disentanglement from politics. Instead, we advance the concept of *contentious urbanization* to

better reflect the political dynamics that shape the process of urban growth. We borrow from the literature on contentious politics, which articulates a vision of the political that involves “public, collective making of consequential claims by connected clusters of persons on other clusters of persons or on major political actors, when at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a third party to the claims” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2007: 2). In other words, we treat urbanization as a form of contentious politics, where the growth of the urban population contributes to competing and often conflicting claims by political actors within the city.

A focus on contentious urbanization requires uncovering political actors, as well as the institutions—formal and informal—that govern daily life. But this approach demands moving beyond political economy analysis, to the dynamic claim making on urban space, as well as the critical resources of land, water, and other services. To bring in this dynamic of urban political bargaining, we borrow from Albert Hirschman to examine the conditions under which growing urban neighborhoods and key actors within them politically engage with the state, and whether they choose to exit the formal system, voice their political grievances, or remain loyal to the governing regime. We pay close attention to the informal networks of power and brokerage that mediate how city dwellers access land, space and services and hence make claims over the city and its benefits.

To explore this more dynamic view of urbanization, we use a strategy of paired comparisons (Tarrow 2010) to explore contentious urbanization of two rapidly growing African cities: Accra, Ghana and Nairobi, Kenya. Accra and Nairobi are two of the most politically and economically important cities in West and East Africa, respectively. Serving as the financial, political, and population center of the country, these “primate” cities have British colonial legacies and are currently under some form of democratic government. They differ—both in time

and space—and historical institutional differences suggest diverging trends in how urbanization is managed within politics. In particular, Accra is an old city, founded in the 1600s if not earlier, with more indigenous forms of political authority and populations who see themselves as the first settlers with more rights to the city. In contrast, the construction of a colonial railway stop in 1895 where Maasai once grazed cattle and local people came to trade but where no settlement existed, catalyzed the formation of Nairobi.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, we outline the two major approaches to urbanization as applied to Africa within political science, which we call the modernization and political economy approaches. We then discuss their strengths and shortcomings, and suggest that a focus on contentious politics and urban claim making does a better job of capturing the reality of urbanization as part of a dynamic contentious politics that has important spatial and social justice impacts. Second, we borrow from Albert Hirschman's theory of exit, voice, and loyalty to theorize how neighborhoods and their political leadership engage with the government, and when they decide to exit the formal system, voice their political grievances, or remain loyal to the governing regime. We also discuss government responses within these bargaining processes. We argue that these interactions—or what Charles Tilly calls *repertoires of contention*—are at the heart of contentious urbanization. Third, using a paired comparison methodology (Tarrow 2010), we tease out repertoires of contention around urbanization in Accra and Nairobi within a historical context. We conclude with the implications for the study of comparative urban politics.

Conventional approaches to comparative urban politics

Modernization approaches to urbanization

Modernization theory gets much of the attention in studies of urbanization, but the linearity in this thinking extends to many public sphere and mobilization approaches to urban politics as well. Modernization theory suggests that as societies become more urban and industrialized, citizens will demand more rights, propagating democratization. While modernization theory was severely critiqued in the 1970s and 80s particularly for its ahistoricity, many of the tenets of the theory, as well as the proposed mechanisms, continue find some empirical support (Epstein et. al. 2006).

For example, in the classic articulation of modernization theory, the transformation from a traditional to modern society contributes to the emergence of liberal and democratic values; this is propagated by urbanization and industrialization (Lipset 1959). As individuals move from rural to urban areas, their preferences change (Inglehart 1997): Ties to traditional ethnic solidarities should weaken (Severino & Ray 2011; Green 2013), and ethnicity plays less of a role in daily life (Robinson 2014). Urban voters then become less susceptible to clientelism, as Koter (2013) finds in Senegal. Cities also act as coordinating mechanisms. High densities reduce the cost of collective action (Wallace 2013) but also of repression (Barro 2013). They also generate institutional and technical innovation as well as new forms of knowledge and thinking (Johnson 2010). Research finds that more urbanized countries have higher levels of democracy and development (Dima et al. 2011).

From a public sphere perspective, cities are arenas of collective will-formation, where people come together in close proximity to deliberate solutions to solve their problems, as well as hold their leaders to account (Habermas 1991). They are sources of new forms of political contestation that destabilize entrenched ethnic and class solidarities (Barnett 2003). In other words, cities are often seen as spaces of protest and democracy where all people—including

those who are politically and economically marginalized—have a “right to the city” (Friedmann 1995; Holston 1999; Dikec 2001; Souza 2001; Purcell 2003; Staeheli 2003).

These approaches tend to romanticize the potential of urbanization, suggesting that the growth of cities offer new opportunities that might disrupt the status quo, leading some influential scholars to even suggest that an “urban revolution” is happening across the world (see Parnell and Pieterse 2014 on Africa; Harvey 2012; Barber 2013). In the African context, even Mamdani (1996) theorized a dualism where cities were historically repositories of civil society compared to rural areas with despotic or ethnic rule (Mamdani 1996). Finally, while Barro 2013 found a strong positive simple correlation between democracy and urbanization, when the standard of living is held constant, the association between urbanization and democracy becomes negative suggesting a more complex relationship (Barro 2013).

Political economy analysis of cities

The celebration of cities as intrinsically democratic and urbanization as democratizing, is at odds with historical experience. A large literature explores cities as sites of exclusion and political repression (e.g. Harvey 2003; Davis 2006). Cities have always been sites of exclusions along ethnic, racial, social, and gender lines, sometimes taking the spatial form of the “ghetto” (Duneier 2016). Emphasizing unequal distribution of public goods and services, residential segregation, and exclusive decision-making organizations and institutions, critical political economy analyses of cities provide a more nuanced understanding of power and the politics within cities.

For example, in late colonial urban development, Africans were often considered visitors to cities without rights. In the older African cities, indigenous claims to land created hierarchies of belonging with settler and native identities being replicated in segregated urban forms. Ethnic

networking in cities, typical of migrant survival strategies anywhere in the world (e.g. Tilly 1998) creates ethnic enclaves that tend to reduce cosmopolitan interactions and produce new forms of spatial separation.

Exclusionary urban planning and segregated residential settlement have important implications for distributional politics and democracy. Public services are often used as patronage goods, and political parties use state resources as a way to consolidate political support, undermining the ideal of democratic deliberation. For example, Noah Nathan finds that in Accra, ethnic diversity and wealth of neighborhoods shapes voting patterns (2016a), contributing to the persistence of particularistic and clientelistic politics in urban areas (2016b). This is consistent with other evidence that ethnic segregation is a key determinant of public goods provision (Ejdemyr, Kramon, & Robinson 2015 test this in Malawi). These dynamics are in no way unique to Africa (see literature on Chicago under Daly and Tammany Hall in NYC). These patronage relationships develop along various lines, including ethnic, class, and partisan. They add an additional, though under emphasized, factor in patterns of loyalty between state institutions, community leaders and citizens and how democratic politics operate if at all in these contexts.

Overall, these rich political economy analyses' focus on institutional rules, land tenure, and political competition go a long way toward explaining variation and persistence in inequality in services and resources across African cities as they gain population, but still obscure some of the political struggles that play out in the process of urbanization. More recently, a focus on the role of "political settlements" looks more closely at the dynamics of bargaining among political elites (Di John and Putzel 2009) and has been applied usefully by Goodfellow (2014) to taxation and development in Kigali. However, the urban bargaining in practice is between elites; elites

and followers; as well as between these local elites and the state, suggesting we need a framework that can encompass this complexity in urban negotiation over power, the city and its services and resources.

Exit, voice, and loyalty: A lens on contentious urbanization

Given that urbanization is a contentious negotiated process of bargaining, we must now explore the conditions—or repertoires of contention—that contribute to different political and development outcomes. We borrow from Albert Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice, and loyalty because it provides a simplified, yet dynamic model, of the interaction between political actors. In his influential theory, Hirschman describes how exit and voice are two possible avenues for recovery of struggling firms or organizations (Hirschman 1970). Exit is the typical model in the economic marketplace, while voice offers a political alternative. Organizations might choose to exit, placing pressure on the producer to improve the quality of the product. But another option is to voice dissatisfaction, thereby placing pressure on producers to create a better product. This option is more likely when there is loyalty between the producer and the consumer.¹ Not all organizations are equally susceptible to exit and voice, and empirical researchers examine the conditions that facilitate the decision of organizations to choose either exit or voice.

The model has also been applied to political outcomes.² We build off the recent model advanced by Clark, Golder & Golder (2017) that advocates an approach that treats exit, voice, and loyalty as three analytically distinct and mutually exclusive categories that are appropriate for the study of politics. Exit refers to the decision of individuals or groups to deny loyalty to the

¹ Gehlbach 2006 advances this classic approach, and formalizes it.

² This framework has been extended to individual behaviors, and widened to include loyalty and neglect as behavioral responses. The EVLN framework has been used to describe dissatisfaction with service provision in local governments (Lyons, Lowery & DeHoog 1992) and performance in urban schools (Matland 1995). It has also been extended to include groups of people, and the distinction between individual and collective behavior is an important one (Dowding et al. 2000). A large literature uses the EVLN framework to analyze the relationship between governments and citizens.

government. Voice refers to the decision not to accept a government policy, but to rather attempt to persuade the government to change its stance. Loyalty is the decision to accept government policy and actions and make no change of pre-existing behavior. These choices are inherently political because they involve struggles for power and decision-making capacity, and different actors will argue for and about different actions within political bargaining.

In the EVL theory of politics, there are two types of governments: those that are *dependent* on the loyalty of the citizenry, and those whom are *autonomous* and value what is seized from the citizenry as much as its loyalty. In response, there are two types of groups of citizens: those with *credible exit threats* that can benefit from exiting, and those without credible exit threats because they benefit from voice or remaining loyal. Therefore, voice is only an option when there is a credible exit threat by the government. Stated simply, citizens must have a credible exit threat, and the state must be dependent on these citizens, for demands to be delivered by the state to its citizens.

We suggest that the EVL theory of politics helps explain contentious urbanization in African cities. Urbanization is an inherently political process, and the incorporation of new political communities into a broader urban framework is not a linear process. The EVL theory of politics helps explain why some neighborhoods are integrated into the urban governance framework and provided land rights, political recognition, and public services. Alternatively, some neighborhoods are kept out of the planning framework and governing apparatus of the city, forced into ghettos or neglected neighborhoods, choosing to exit the formal political system altogether or persisting as loyal citizens without full rights. In this conceptualization, urban neighborhoods act as organizations or firms and must decide when to exit the political system and reject being loyal to the government, use voice to participate in the political process and

demand improvements, or remain loyal to the governing party while the status quo persists. In our theorization, we treat “urban neighborhoods” as bounded for analytical clarity, knowing full well that there is significant variation in the makeup of urban neighborhoods and complex divisions and debates within these places. The “government” refers to the governing party at the national level. The challenge exists in uncovering the conditions under which neighborhoods have credible exit threats, and when governments remain dependent on the neighborhoods for loyalty of its citizens, which have the leverage in more democratic systems of constituting significant numbers of voters. The theory is particularly relevant to poor slums and informal settlements in democratizing states because service delivery and public goods provision to these neighborhoods are unsatisfactory and unequal given the overall mandate of popularly elected governments to protect and provide for its population.

In the development of African cities, governments make difficult decisions about urban planning, integrating migrant communities, and development. Governments might incorporate populations into the formal governance structures, distribute land and property rights to migrants and squatters, and upgrade communities by delivering public goods and improving infrastructure. Dating back to colonial times, less powerful communities and their leaders have used a variety of strategies like land squatting, affiliating with colonial administrators, establishing patronage relationships with authorities, and organizing non-state security forces in their struggle for political power. The EVL model of politics helps formalize these decisions as a set of choices and options within negotiations between governments and communities that intensifies as urbanization unfolds along with demands for resources, space and services.

The government is either autonomous or dependent on urban neighborhoods. We suggest that they are dependent for two reasons: as vote banks to win elections or as landholders to

facilitate development. They are autonomous when the government benefits more from expropriating rents or doing nothing, than from formally incorporating them into the decision-making apparatus. Therefore, the government has three possible choices in how they interact with urban neighborhoods: demolish their structures and seize their land; recognize the settlements and provide public services; or do nothing and the status quo persists.

Urban neighborhoods have their own choice sets. They can exercise voice by demanding political recognition and distribution of land rights and public services. They can exit the formal decision-making process by establishing parallel security apparatuses and informally providing housing and services. Or they can remain loyal to the government while no formal urban development takes place. This is a surprisingly ubiquitous outcome in urban Africa. Importantly, only urban neighborhoods that have credible threats can exercise voice. Urban neighborhoods have credible threats when they can threaten mass insecurity, vote the government out of power, or control valuable land. But this does not mean that voice is a less costly option. In many cases, urban neighborhoods exit the political system or remain loyal to the governing party because it is the least costly option, particularly for community leaders who might be benefitting from the status quo (see discussion below).

Table 1: Choice sets for urban actors

	Exit	Voice	Loyalty
Urban Neighborhood	Parallel governance and informal service provision	Demand recognition, land rights, and services, protest/sabotage/resist	Support government by doing nothing
	Coerce	Respond	Ignore
Government	Demolish structures and displace residents/ Repression, extract rents and bribes	Recognize settlements and provide public services	Do nothing/neglect


While informal settlements and slums are often noted for low state capacity or limited statehood, we document significant variation in the level of incorporation into formal politics, institutionalization of law and order, and distribution of public services across time and space in urban African neighborhoods. In line with the theory, we predict five bargaining positions or states of negotiation in Figure 1.³ First, we suggest that the government makes the first move, and decides to respond, coerce, or ignore the neighborhood. The government responds because it is dependent on the neighborhood for votes, land or security or ignores because it is autonomous. Otherwise the government coerces the neighborhood as a strategy to gain loyalty, or the land.

Second, and in response, if the neighborhood has a credible exit threat and benefits from the cost of leaving the formal system, it exits. It can also voice dissatisfaction and demand recognition. If the neighborhood lacks a credible exit threat, it remains loyal to the government. Third, if the neighborhood remains loyal, the government can coerce if it is autonomous or ignore if it is dependent on the neighborhood for votes. Fourth, if the neighborhood voices in the previous stage of bargaining, it can respond if it is dependent on a neighborhood with a credible exit threat. It can ignore if it does not need land from the neighborhood, gaining loyalty of residents in the process. It can also continue with its coercive threat if it wants to expropriate rents or land. Fifth, a neighborhood exits if it can, or remains loyal to the government, potentially losing their neighborhood in the process.

Table 2 includes a description of the bargaining process with the possible outcomes, as well as the underlying bargaining positions. We posit that these negotiating positions and stages explain the process of contentious urbanization in Accra and Nairobi.

³ Clark, Golder & Golder call these equilibria.

Figure 1: Government-Neighborhood Bargaining



0=Cost to government of status quo; E=Cost of neighborhood's exit payoff; 1=Value of benefit to neighborhood; L=Value of loyal neighborhood to government; C=Neighborhood cost of using voice; Cg=Cost to government of neighborhood using voice; Cu=Cost to government of upgrading neighborhood

Table 2: Possible Outcomes and their underlying conditions

1) Government ignores: Autonomous government + No credible exit threat
2) Govt. coerces → Neighborhood loyal → Govt. ignores: Autonomous govt. + No credible exit
3) Govt. coerces → Neighborhood loyal → Govt. coerces: Dependent govt. + No credible exit
4) Govt. coerces → Neighborhood voices → Govt. ignores: Autonomous govt. + Credible exit
5) Govt. coerces → Neighborhood voices → Govt. coerces → Neighborhood loyal: Autonomous govt. + Credible exit threat
6) Govt. coerces → Neighborhood exits: Dependent government + Credible exit
7) Govt. coerces → Neighborhood voices → Govt. coerces → Neighborhood exits: Dependent govt. + Credible exit
8) Govt. coerces → Neighborhood voices → Govt. responds: Dependent Govt. + Credible exit threat
9) Govt. responds: Dependent govt. + Credible exit threat

The EVL model of politics helps us explain why some urban neighborhoods exit the political system and govern their communities independently or remain loyal to a status quo government that undermines their own interest, while others voice their concerns and engage directly in the formal political decision-making process. The theory is complicated by the fact that each of these decisions have costs, and the cost-benefit is further hampered by impediments to collective action, as Barry 1974 pointed out in his early critique of Hirschman's theory. In other words, there are significant differences between what Dowding et al. 2000 describes as individual voice (where the decision is meant to bring about an outcome) and collective voice (where the decision is meant to contribute to a desired effect through action).

We find that informal networks of power and brokerage provide the key variable in overcoming collective action problems, and helps explain the type of loyalty that exists between state institutions and local actors. Hirschman pointed to the significance of this potential group of people in his original theory: "One characteristic is crucial in all of the foregoing situations: those customers who care *most* about the quality of the product and who, therefore, are those who would be the most active, reliable, and creative agents of voice are for that very reason also those who are apparently likely to exit first in case of deterioration" (47). In this case, the high-quality conscious consumers are the most important. Examining the *patterns of loyalty* among this group of people—the community leaders in urban Africa—provides the potential for exit and voice in urban Ghana and Kenya. This also forces us to consider the importance of collective action because these leaders are instrumental in organizing protests, but also in preventing transformative change (Barry 1974).

The EVL model of politics advances our understanding of contentious urbanization in three important ways. First, it draws our attention to the actors, interests, and incentives of urban

neighborhoods and governments, and demonstrates the importance of these linkages in the growth of cities. Second, it views urban growth as a contentious and political struggle that needs to be explained. Third, it helps provide an explanation for the inequitable distribution of land rights, public goods, and security across urban space.

Contentious urbanization in Accra

Accra has grown from a small fishing village made up of the Ga ethnic group, to a heterogeneous city that is inhabited by people from dozens of different groups (Acquah 1958). Accra became an economic center of the region in the 1600s, as Gas profited from trading slaves, gold dust, and palm oil in exchange for European goods like guns and gunpowder.⁴ At the very early years of settlement, indigenous leaders offered land to Europeans, and they built forts to strengthen their coercive capacity, as well as spread economic influence.⁵ They used these weapons to withstand raids from other tribes; mainly Akwamus who sought to extend their territory from the nearby hills toward the East (Wilks 1957). From the earliest years of Accra's population growth, the indigenous Ga attempted to protect territory from ethnic outsiders, using its custodianship over land as an important political resource in establishing middlemen status with European traders.

These relationships became further entrenched under colonial rule, as the British formally institutionalized these roles in their system of indirect rule. Ga traditional authorities used these privileged positions to gain power, status, and prestige in their own city (Parker 2000; Sackeyfio-Lenoch 2014).⁶ Accra became the administrative capital of the Gold Coast in 1877, contributing to its growth, as it became the headquarters for business dealings and political decision-making. Ga leaders became important figures in the real estate market when the British passed the Public

⁴ The first Europeans arrived in the 1400s, constructing a fort in Elmina in 1471. At first, they were mostly interested in gold.

⁵ For good sources about the origins of Accra, see Reindorf 1966; Field 1937; Ozanne 1962; Dickson 1969.

⁶ Intermixing also contributed to a new class of people. These mulattoes, called "merchant princes," gained a privileged status in society and became part of the intellectual and political class over time (Daniell 1856).

Lands Ordinance in 1876, shifting the land tenure regime from a traditional system to a modern one that witnessed the rise of land alienation in the subsequent colonial period (Quarcoopome 1992). Modern urban development contributed to rising land prices, as well as the shift to a rights-based land tenure regime (Pogucki 1955: 21).

In the next sections, we outline contentious urbanization over the course of four phases: colonial rule (1874-1957); Independence (1957-1966); post-Nkrumah (1966-1992); and multi-party democracy (1992-present).

Colonial rule: From exit to voice

The early economic and political origins set Accra on the path to the primate city it is today. The colonial government was relatively autonomous from indigenous leaders, allowing local authority structures to exit the formal system and rule their populations, enabling the status quo of unequal development to persist. Indigenous populations lived in neighborhoods outside the formal town planning structures, designated slums or urban villages in the official documents.⁷ Colonial rulers made early attempts at incorporation of local chiefs to maintain stability and expropriate land, but these measures were never formally institutionalized.

Contentious politics emerged in the very early years of colonial rule. The administration of the town was never easy, as the British attempted to win over indigenous chiefs and integrate them into municipal governance, relying on them to collect taxes and manage sanitation measures. But the chiefs did not carry out their mandate quietly. For example, in 1859 chiefs incited residents to protest paying the municipal tax rate (Acquah 1958: 22). Resistance to colonial tax policy was ongoing throughout colonial rule, and the main impediment to establishing the Municipal Council; an ordinance to set up the council was finally passed in 1898 (Akyeampong 2002). But colonial administrators never fully depended on indigenous

⁷ This exemplifies the first bargaining position.

neighborhoods for facilitating development, and the neighborhoods did not pose a significant threat to urban security or livelihoods.

Public health concerns changed the dynamics of urban politics, forging a new dependence on indigenous neighborhoods to prevent mass insecurity. The bubonic plague outbreak in 1907 intensified the need for formal institutionalization and stronger state capacity, demonstrating to commoners the value of the Municipal Council. A key part of the sanitation measures involved the organization of a demolition committee after the outbreak. But it failed in its efforts because it did not consult with traditional authorities at the grassroots (Quarcoopome 1993: 23). An additional shift in leadership patterns occurred in 1910 when the Colonial Administration began recognizing stranger headman outside the authority structure of the Ga traditional chieftaincy system, serving as a strategy of divide and rule that contributed to more power for the Accra Municipal Council (Arn 1996: 436).⁸

The growth of Accra involved the influx of Northerners, who were instrumental in transport and trade (Ntewusu 2011).⁹ Increased migration to Accra was also the result of conflicts in other parts of the country, like the 1894 disagreements between northerners and the indigenous leaders of Kete-Krachi, which initially controlled the kola nut trade (Maier 1980).¹⁰ Northerners were influential members of the Gold Coast Constabulary, a police force that was used in the wars against the Ashanti, and in quelling riots in Accra (Parker 2000: 105).

The formation of new neighborhoods made up of mostly Northerners was part of the contentious urbanization process, as migrant leaders jockeyed for political position and

⁸ This exemplifies the second bargaining position.

⁹ These include people from Northern, Upper East, and Upper West Regions, as well as people originating from Burkina Faso, Niger, Togo and Nigeria. The most common ethnic groups are the Yoruba, Hausa, Fulani, Kotokoli, Mossi, Dagomba, Mamprusi, Grushi, and Gonja.

¹⁰ There was also an influx of Northern migrants in 1874 as a result of the British-Ashanti War (Ntewusu 2011). There was another influx in the early 1900s as a result of the burgeoning cocoa trade (Brand 1972).

mobilized their followers for privileged positions among indigenous landowners, as well as colonial authorities (Pellow 2002).¹¹ With declining cooperation of indigenous Ga leaders in municipal governance, especially with respect to collecting taxes, colonial administrators allied with migrant leaders and integrated them into the decision-making process (Ntewusu 2011: 37). Importantly, the formation of new neighborhoods was not a linear story of natural population growth, but a political process and response to disease outbreaks, where migrant leaders jockeyed for space to extend their political power.¹² For example, Chief Braimah founded the neighborhood of Tudu in 1911, and Sabon Zongo was founded around 1912.¹³

Fulani herdsmen moved from Tudu and Adabraka to the new a new neighborhood called Nima in the early 1920s, preferring more space and authority (Dakubu 1997). The origin of Nima traces back to cattle dealer and prominent Muslim teacher Alhaji Futa, who secured cattle grazing land from the Odukpong family of Osu and the Gbese people of Old Accra (Chambas 1973). Migrants moved in large numbers to Nima in the 1930s because they could not find accommodation in the growing city center, but also to avoid taxation as it sat outside the Accra Municipal boundary (Chambas 1973: 37). In this way, community leadership chose to exit the formal political system, allowing them to control their populations and provide informal services outside the control of colonial administrators.¹⁴

Though Accra does not have natural resource endowments, it benefitted from the Gold Coast's growing cocoa trade as the commercial capital and port city. The 1919 and 1920 cocoa booms "brought an air of prosperity" to Accra, contributing to population growth, including the

¹¹ Even the naming of neighborhoods is contentious, because "the power to control how the community is referred to by others" becomes a powerful "historical text" (Dakubu 1997: 10).

¹² The legal system also codified three separate types of people, "natives," "subjects," and "migrants." Natives were indigenous to Ghana, while subjects were immigrants from any British colony. Natives and subjects enjoyed British citizenship (Mabogunje 1972: 122). Migrants from neighboring French colonies were deemed migrants.

¹³ Sabon Zongo saw 12 percent growth between World War I and II was 12 percent (Brand 1972).

¹⁴ This exemplifies the first bargaining position.

arrival of Asian, Lebanese, and Syrian merchants (Acquah 1958: 20). This coincided with the governorship of Sir Frederick Gordon Guggisberg (1919-1926) who is credited with the modernization of the capital city. The insertion of Accra into a global trading network “revolutionized” the city, contributing to the rise of land values, influx of capital and currency, and increasing dependency on the British (McPhee 1926: 2). The emerging kola nut and palm oil industries contributed to the increase in Northern migrants living in Accra (Ntewusu 2011).

The indigenous chiefs used this atmosphere of prosperity as an opportunity to demand public services; they collectively mobilized and secured the construction of gutters and wells (McPhee 1926). Benefitting from an enabling economy, the colonial government relied on close ties to indigenous leaders for access to land. The government built Achimota School, Korle Bu Teaching Hospital, and many other structures that signaled modern development. The colonial government sought to centralize planning, and the incorporation of indigenous populations into the decision-making apparatus was part of this strategy. The 1939 earthquake further intensified the need to build more housing and centralize planning, leading to the incorporation of Labadi in 1943, and government-built housing estates in many surrounding suburbs (Acquah 1958: 28).

Additional relocation of populations occurred after the earthquake, including resettled populations in Korle Gonno. During World War II Nima residents served military officials in the nearby service barracks, working as cooks, stewards, laborers, porters, and prostitutes (Chambas 1973:37). The demobilization of African troops in 1947 led to the move of ex-servicemen—many of northern descent, as well as people from the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria—to Nima. Though the Gold Coast Housing Authority prepared a plan for the systematic growth of the neighborhood in 1945, no real infrastructural improvements were made. Residents relied on ethnic headman for support, establishing patron-client relationships with them. Chiefs offered

accommodation, job opportunities, and protection in exchange for honor and esteem. By the end of colonial rule, a stable equilibrium existed between indigenous leaders, migrant headmen, and formal government structures.

Independence: From voice to loyalty

Ghana's path to Independence is typically described in linear terms: the urbanization of society coupled with a growing and ever-powerful political class contributed to a vibrant Independence movement. A cross-ethnic and cross-class movement emerged in Accra, leading to collective mobilization, but never guerilla warfare in the countryside or mass violence. In addition, the lack of a settler colony in British West Africa was seen as a boon to indirect rule and eventual independent rule, allowing a shift of authority that was already working in concert. But this linear approach obscures the rise of contention between a growing urban intelligentsia and traditional authorities that date back to early years of colonial rule. The introduction of multi-party politics intensified these rivalries (Yakah 2016).

Early signs of unrest occurred in the 1930s over the price of cocoa, as Ashanti chiefs aligned with colonial authorities to raise the price of cacao (Austin 1970: 10). These growing divisions played out in protests in the Accra riots of 1948, where an estimated 29 people were killed and 200 injured in demonstrations over food prices. These protests signaled more than an elite fracture, but also the rise of ordinary commoners in the political process, especially "elementary-school-leavers" who were looking for a political voice (Austin 1970: 15). The Convention People's Party (CPP) took advantage of these disgruntled commoners, and mobilized them into their organizational machinery—especially in urban areas like Accra: "The youth societies became branches, and the malcontents party secretaries" (ibid: 27).

This had important implications for urban governance: the CPP co-opted metropolitan affairs, and there was little separation between the party's organization and city hall. The urban poor remained loyal to the CPP, receiving private and club goods in return, even though no large-scale development occurred.¹⁵ The CPP could win the necessary votes by catering to the private needs of the urban masses, while overlooking urban development projects. During this period, the CPP was particularly concerned with winning enough votes, as political competition was incredibly high, as well as quashing opposition.

The CPP saw important resistance to their leadership in the early years of its rule in Accra, when the *Ga Shifimo Kpee* – “Ga Standfast Association” – split off from the CPP in Nkrumah's own Odododiodioo constituency. The Ga nationalist organization demanded better services, employment opportunities, and housing accommodation (Hodge 1964). They couched these demands in tribal and ethnic language, relying on demands of indigeneity and entitlement drawn from the roots to the capital city. But these fears extended to issues of land alienation, where Gas feared the influx of outsiders into their city, particularly those of the Akan (Fridy and Brobbey 2009). The political economy of land contributed to these fears: due to a demand for government and private firms, the price of land increased significantly in the early 1950s, and Ga landlords alienated thousands of acres of land to turn a profit (Pogucki 1955). Land speculation became a lucrative business, and Ga leaders and politicians benefitted from the rising land values (Onoma 2009).

By the early 1950s, the land question was the most contentious issue in Accra, with prominent Ga leaders accusing Nkrumah of selling off their land to outsiders (Quarcoopome 1992: 47). While the *Ga Shifimo Kpee* did not gain widespread support due to its close connections to the political opposition, it did force the CPP to confront the land question, and

¹⁵ This exemplifies the fourth bargaining position.

organize its own counter Ga nationalist organization, the *Ga ekomefeemo kpee*. Battles between these two groups in the streets of Old Accra became rowdy and violent (Hodge 1964). But more importantly, it encouraged the state to get more involved in land deals and restrict the sales of land to foreign businesses, contributing to the politicization of land rights in the city. Just as importantly, the CPP used the state apparatus to weaken its opposition. Nkrumah went as far as to arrest 43 members of the *Ga Shifimo Kpee*, accusing them of trying to overthrow the government (Quarcoopome 1992: 49).

Nkrumah's centralization of power was a political strategy to counteract growing opposition from various parts of the country, including Ashanti and northern regions (Rathbone 2000; Yakah 2016). The tightening of power spilled over to urban governance, contributing to coercive management including demolitions and displacements. State-led development projects were central to Nkrumah's plan to modernize the country, and cities were at the forefront of his industrialization policies. For example, the government of Ghana acquired the land surrounding the Korle Lagoon (which includes modern day Old Fadama) in 1961 for purposes of urban development, paying relevant compensation to the Gbese and Korle stools, and relocating residents to New Fadama (Grant 2006). Additionally, Nkrumah developed the city of Tema on the outskirts of Accra, and moved the major port there (Chalfin 2014). These strategies had consequences: they established social control over certain populations, and institutionalized patterns of loyalty and patronage with selected neighborhoods and community leaders. Nkrumah cracked down on opposition, making voice a costly strategy. Nkrumah's industrial strategy also undermined the price of agricultural goods, contributing to the rapid migration of rural dwellers to cities looking for work (Bates 1981). Once in cities, migrants competed with indigenous

traders for jobs and economic influence, contributing to local tensions during the ensuing decades (Peil 1974; Kobo 2010; Honig 2016).

The government also had to deal with growing dissatisfaction in Accra stranger communities, like Nima and Sabon Zongo. These neighborhoods symbolized Accra's growing population, as well as the rise of a heterogeneous population and the formation of a cosmopolitan city.¹⁶ In 1949, the Nima Development Committee formed to demand development and represent the interests of residents (Chambas 1973: 85). The committee was set up to lobby the government to provide services to the neighborhood.¹⁷ In 1951 Nima was officially incorporated into the city limits of Accra. In 1952, Kwame Nkrumah led a large rally in the neighborhood and promised to transform Nima into a "city in a city," a slogan that has not been forgotten by the residents of the neighborhood (Chambas 1973: 88). The struggle for authority deepened when the CPP extended its organizational machinery into the slum in 1953, co-opting already existing groups like the Young Pioneers and the Worker's Brigade (ibid).¹⁸

The Ghanaian government specifically highlighted settlements with large migrant communities like Nima and Maamobi as neighborhoods that were under-resourced and in need of upgrading in its urban plans. In 1954, local ward members aligned with the governing political party were successful in getting four public latrines built for residents. The struggle to upgrade Nima, as well as distribute resources to the slum, was highly contentious. Arn (1996) tells the history of attempted intervention in Nima, documenting the proposed campaigns of slum clearance that started with the "Accra Slum Clearance Committee" formed in 1961. The

¹⁶ By 1960, the African alien population had risen to 98,780 people, making up approximately 30 percent of the population (Quarcoopome 1993: 29). By this time, the Ga population made up only 51.6 percent of the population (Acquah 1958).

¹⁷ Kobo (2010) suggests that a *zongo* Muslim identity arose after the 1948 earthquake. Muslim leaders organized to demand help to rebuild their homes, presenting a new challenge to Nkrumah's rule (Kobo 2010: 72).

¹⁸ Nkrumah personally elicited the support of *zongo* leaders in the lead up to the 1956 elections, giving them the title "chief of propaganda" (Rouch 1956: 58-9).

committee identified Labadi, Nima, and James Town as potential spaces for upgrading, but Nima leaders never organized effectively to make the plan a reality. Over the course of the 1950s and 60s, the government shifted from a strategy of recognition and service provision, to ignoring them altogether. While it threatened to evict and displace them, the CPP's dependence on their political support contributed to an equilibrium where the communities exited formal governance, and the government continued to ignore the needs of the population.¹⁹

The integration of migrants into the city contributed to contentious urbanization as well. Nkrumah used citizenship laws to weaken his opposition. For example, in 1957 he deported several opposition leaders and Lebanese and Syrian merchants because they were “threats of the social order” (Kobo 2010: 75). The Aliens Act of 1963 required all non-citizens to have residence permits. In 1968, the Legislative Instrument 553 ordered all migrants to have a work permit (Peil 1971). These political tensions intensified after Nkrumah left office.

Post-Nkrumah: From loyalty to voice

After the overthrow of the CPP in 1966, there was a small political opening at the grassroots for collective action. For example, the residents' committee in Nima was reformed and renamed the Nima Development and Welfare Committee. Though chiefs showed up at early meetings, recruiting members was needed because the chiefs and tribal elders stopped showing up to community meetings, signaling their political apathy (Chambas 1973: 87). Independent political voice was difficult to achieve, as political parties quickly got involved. Politicians in the Progress Party like I.C. Quaye, attempted to disband the welfare committee due to its expected allegiance to the CPP. Residents were also afraid to get involved in community affairs because of widespread condemnation by the new government; citizens feared that their previous connections to the CPP could get them in trouble, even jailed.

¹⁹ This exemplifies the fourth bargaining position.

In 1970, a more serious plan came from the Accra-Tema Metropolitan Planning Office, calling for the relocation of more than 50 percent of residents for redevelopment (ibid: 438). The headline of a Daily Graphic article on March 4, 1970 was “Nima to go.” A “commercial speculative scheme” was introduced in 1972, with plans to relocate residents to Madina, Ashaiman, or Dansoman. In 1973, Ghana’s head of state Col. Acheampong led a sod cutting ceremony for this project. As the population of Accra spread out from downtown, Nima now sat on valuable land in the center of the city. Redeveloping the neighborhood could help modernize the city, and provide investment and kickbacks to the political and business class.

Vibrant collective action among community members was crucial to the community’s resistance to eviction and demolition. Chiefs and landlords were most vocal against the redevelopment plans, realizing that it was an attack on their authority. In 1968, Christian students from University of Ghana formed Operation Help Nima to resist the redevelopment plans.²⁰ Their strategy shifted from demanding help from the outside, to “help the people of Nima help themselves” (Chambas 1973: 99). The organization centralized leadership in the community, even bringing together leaders of Nima and Maamobi into a unified structure. But the group was also instrumental in getting the Odorkwei family, the traditional landowners of Nima, into the political decision-making in Nima by incorporating them into the welfare committee (Chambas 1973: 69). This bargain had an important consequence: it signaled a political alliance with the indigenous Ga, lessening the fear that indigenes had of the new migrants.

The organization was also instrumental in getting compensation and relocation options for residents when construction for the Nima Highway began in 1975. But there was internal contention: some residents accused them of serving the interests of the landlords, and not the

²⁰ OHN was funded by Christian organizations in Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, and other Western countries through the Christian Council of Ghana.

majority of poor dwellers in the neighborhood. Over time, OHN became the de facto spokesperson for the community, contributing to friction between them and community leaders and chiefs.²¹ Not surprisingly, local politics got in the way. But the neighborhood's collective capacity placed important pressure on government authorities to provide services and development, and to prevent forceful evictions from their property.²²

The incorporation of “aliens” remained a contentious issue. In 1969 the Busia government decreed the Aliens Compliance Order, demanding all “aliens” without residency permits to leave the country within two weeks. The Order severely impacted the Yoruba and Igbo immigrants, who were seen as a local economic threat to indigenous urban traders (Honig 2016). During a severe economic downturn, migrants threatened the governing regime, and expelling them was a tactic used to undermine the political power of the opposition (Kobo 2010). But alliances with host populations allowed these populations to overcome these expulsions and return to these neighborhoods when relations were regularized. The Order solidified *zongo* neighborhoods as reliable vote banks for parties of the Nkrumahist tradition, as *zongo* residents could no longer trust parties in the Danquah-Busia tradition.²³ Clearly, government policies significantly shaped residential and political patterns in postcolonial urban development.

Multi-party democracy: From loyalty to voice

Today, Accra is an ethnically diverse city and a multi-party democracy.²⁴ But the institution of indigeneity—the norm that groups indigenous to a territory hold special rights and entitlements—continues to structure the politics of Accra (Paller 2014b). Ga representatives

²¹ As one leader said, “Every year the OHN people get money from abroad on our behalf but they never let us know how much. And always they tell us they have discussed so and so with the government – sometimes we don’t really understand the proposals they put forward to the government on our behalf but we hope they are actually going to be in our interests in the future” (quoted in Chambas 1973: 108).

²² This exemplifies the second bargaining position.

²³ This exemplifies the fourth bargaining position.

²⁴ According to the 2010 census, 40 percent of the city is Akan; 27 percent is Ga; 20 percent is Ewe; and 13 percent is northern ethnic groups.

make up more than half of the city's Parliamentary seats, as well as the majority of leadership positions in district governments (Ichino and Nathan 2016). Ethnicity and wealth still play an important factor in politics at the neighborhood-level. For example, individuals in ethnically homogenous neighborhoods—particularly those with a majority of Ga residents—are more likely to consider ethnicity in their vote choice because they can expect the distribution of club or private goods to their neighborhood (Nathan 2016a). This is even more likely to occur in poor neighborhoods, like urban slums, where individuals rely on patronage relationships with politicians for daily survival and employment opportunities (Paller 2014). Local context continues to shape politics and urban development, in contrast to individual attitudes and motivations.²⁵

These factors contribute to contentious urbanization because the growth of the city coupled with insecure and ambiguous property rights have transformed Accra's cityscape (Grant 2009). While squatter settlements were rare in West Africa before 1990 (Peil 1976; Konadu-Agyemang 1991), they have proliferated across the continent in the last 25 years (Fox 2014). Increasing land values mixed with rapid urbanization has forced poor migrants to squat on government land and private property. The emergence of squatter settlements has contributed to the rise of urban land conflicts.²⁶ Rakodi attributes these conflicts—which often result in evictions and demolitions—to conflicts between the “occupiers” and government agencies over the political recognition of urban space (Rakodi 2016). The lack of clarity between different land regimes, as well as overlapping authority structures and ambiguous tenure jurisdictions, contribute to these problems (McAuslan 2003; Payne 2001). Government policies have been unable to solve these challenges. They have not produced improvements in neighborhood

²⁵ Kasara 2013 and Klaus and Paller 2016 also take this approach.

²⁶ Lombard and Rakodi 2016 provide an overview of this phenomenon across the world.

infrastructure and youth unemployment, instead focusing on land tenure formalization and public-private partnerships that advantage the elite (Obeng-Odoom 2010).

At the grassroots, claims to urban space, as well as demands for rights to the city, are interpreted differently by various actors, and framed by politicians and powerful actors to empower themselves and serve private interests (Van Leeuwen and Van der Haar 2016). In addition, informality is often used as a way to maintain power, reinforce patron-client relationships, and maintain the political status quo (Roy 2009). Governments frame squatters as a nuisance, dangerous, and unsanitary (Afenah 2012). Today, this stage of urbanization exists alongside rising globalization, contributing to new political geographies that connect the local and the global scales (Grant 2006, 2009). The growing importance of international organizations like the World Bank, Slum Dwellers International, and Amnesty International in urban planning and funding slum-upgrading projects shifts incentives on the ground, and provide new sources of funding for urban priorities (Gulyani and Talukdar 2007; Huchzermeyer 2011). They also contribute to neighborhood political rivalries and new types of community decision-making (Stacey and Lund 2016; Paller 2015).

The best example of the impact that global actors play in contentious urbanization involves the struggles for incorporation of Old Fadama, a squatter settlement that is locally called “Sodom and Gomorrah.” The struggle for political recognition has been well documented (Grant 2006; Afenah 2010; Braimah 2011). But the role that neighborhood leaders play, as well as the incentives of NGOs and their intermediaries is less understood. The rapid growth of Old Fadama is illustrative of the rise in the population of squatters across the country.²⁷ In 2002, the community received an eviction notice, ordered to quit the neighborhood to give way to the

²⁷ In 2004, the Ghana Homeless People’s Federation estimated the population of Old Fadama at 24,165. By 2006, community leaders estimated the number to be closer to 35,000 (Grant 2006). A community-led enumeration in 2009 counted 79,684 residents (Braimah and Owusu 2012).

Korle Lagoon Ecological Restoration Project. The Centre for Public Interest Law fought on behalf of the evicted in court, but lost. Though the government did not follow through with the eviction, it continued to use early morning sweeps—locally called “join the line”—to spark fear in the population and impose social control. While the government wanted to develop the land as part of its campaign to modernize the capital city, the residents made up an important vote bank in the very important and competitive Odododiodioo Constituency. The campaign in the lead up to the 2004 election quelled the immediate eviction, and the defeat of the NPP parliamentary candidate provided a short-term safety net for Old Fadama residents, who helped win the election for the NDC candidate.²⁸

Leaders in the neighborhood organized with help from the NGO People’s Dialogue for Human Settlements (PD), an affiliate of the international Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI). The NGO immediately became the spokesperson for the community, forming the Ghana Federation for the Urban Poor (GHAFUP) as a subsidiary that it could control and collectively organize when need be, as well as Old Fadama Development Association (OFADA) as a leadership body. Farouk Braimah, the executive director of the organization and expert on urban development, established close ties with the Ministry of Water Resources, Works & Housing, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and the Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations, as well as the mayor of Accra (Braimah 2011). A plan was put in place to resettle the residents, making PD the de facto organization that would control the process on the ground, giving its leadership control over funding and selecting recipients. In the meantime, PD

²⁸ Personal interview 2012.

urged residents not to build permanent houses, nor invest in public services, wanting to signal to the metropolitan authorities that it was ready to relocate.²⁹

But the 2008 elections changed these tactics. The incoming NDC government appointed a new mayor, and internally disputed what to do about the neighborhood. The mayor had alliances with the Ga chiefs, and promoted eviction and demolition without supporting compensation. The chiefs viewed the squatters as trespassers on their land and city, and an impediment to potential kickbacks on development deals. The President, on the other hand, urged the protection of human rights and “eviction with a human face.” When John Mahama became President in 2012, rumors spread that his brother had plans to redevelop the Korle Lagoon environs, sparking new fears of potential eviction.

Meanwhile, the neighborhood had grown to 80,000 residents, and NDC politicians relied on these people for votes.³⁰ From 2008-2016, the NDC extended its organizational machinery even more, expanding from 11 local branches to 27. Without the capacity to demolish all the structures at once, the mayor targeted sections of the neighborhood, focusing on the outer edges of the slum. Demolitions occurred in 2012 and 2015, signaling the coercive capacity of the metropolitan government.

With new eviction threats, PD now had something to fight for again, and re-entered the decision-making sphere.³¹ Evictions offer opportunities for NGOs to enter political decision-making. PD revived OFADA after the demolition, and began organizing community leaders.³² Old Fadama community leaders continued to restrict decision-making to be a private affair. With

²⁹ There are also rumors that the Vice President was in charge of negotiations, but could not broker a solution in a timely manner.

³⁰ For these reasons, the situation has largely exemplified the fourth bargaining position.

³¹ Stacey and Lund (2016) assert “OFADA interprets interactions with government as a validation of their claims as a legitimate local authority and facilitator of local development” (610).

³² This exemplifies the second bargaining position.

a recent victory by the NPP in the 2016 elections, Braimah is well positioned to play a major role in the new government.³³ In addition, residents are now considered rightful residents in the city—but not landowners, showing how rights to the city are outcomes of contentious urbanization.³⁴

One of the major changes is that the city authorities now recognize the Yam Market, which sits on the edge of the neighborhood. Leaders of the market have direct interaction with city authorities without passing through Chairman and OFADA. They get sanitation in the market. They also pay market tolls to AMA. Therefore, the immediate surroundings of the market are considered safe from demolition. Because this neighborhood is made up of people from the Konkomba ethnic group, their chief has become very powerful. The assemblyman also plays a political role as more parts of the slum become legally recognized, largely because of the vibrant commercial activity.

All of these developments have led to what Stacey and Lund (2016) label a “state of slum,” where there is “a sharp contrast between locally produced institutions that enjoy the power to govern but do not have the legal backing to exercise authority, and statutory institutions that are assigned the formal authority to rule but do not have the power to do so.”³⁵ Rather, the constant, daily interactions between informal authorities and municipal workers, party agents and opinion leaders, blur the neat line between state and society. One thing is clear: the battle for legitimate status is a political one, and extends far beyond NGOs like PD and municipal authorities like AMA, to the opinion leaders and political parties that govern these spaces.

³³ One of the major contributions to the NPP’s electoral victory was its ability to make inroads to *zongo* communities, increasing its support in urban areas (Bob-Milliar and Paller 2017).

³⁴ The current outcome exemplifies a combination of the second and third bargaining positions.

³⁵ Stacey and Lund 2016: 611.

As the historical development of Accra suggests, urbanization is not a linear process. Nor can static political economy analysis explain the contentious politics that occur in urban space. Though politicians, bureaucrats, chiefs, and community leaders react to—and are shaped by—their institutional environments, they also engage in the repertoires of contention that make the urbanization process possible.

Contentious urbanization in Nairobi

In progress

Conclusion

In progress

Bibliography

- Acquah, Ioné. “Accra survey; a social survey of the capital of Ghana, formerly called the Gold Coast, undertaken for the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1953-1956.” (1958).
- Afenah, Afia. “Engineering a millennium city in Accra, Ghana: the Old Fadama intractable issue.” *Urban Forum*. Vol. 23. No. 4. Springer Netherlands, 2012.
- African Development Bank Group. 2012. “Urbanization in Africa.” Available: <http://www.afdb.org/en/blogs/afdb-championing-inclusive-growth-across-africa/post/urbanization-in-africa-10143/>
- Akyeampong, Emmanuel. “Bukom and the social history of boxing in Accra: warfare and citizenship in precolonial Ga society.” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 35.1 (2002): 39-60.
- Arn, Jack. “Third world urbanization and the creation of a relative surplus population: A history of Accra, Ghana to 1980.” *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* (1996): 413-443.
- Austin, Dennis. *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960*. Vol. 242. Oxford University Press, 1970.
- Barber, Benjamin R. *If mayors ruled the world: Dysfunctional nations, rising cities*. Yale University Press, 2013.
- Bates, Robert. *States and markets in tropical Africa: The political basis of agricultural policy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- Barnett, Jonathan. *Redesigning Cities. Principles, Practice, Implementation*. 2003.
- Barry, Brian. “Review article: ‘Exit, voice, and loyalty’.” *British Journal of Political Science* 4.01 (1974): 79-107.
- Braimah, Farouk R. “A Decade of Struggles and Lessons at Old Fadama.” *SDI. net Blog* (2011).

- Farouk, Braimah R., and Mensah Owusu. ““If in doubt, count”: the role of community-driven enumerations in blocking eviction in Old Fadama, Accra.” *Environment and Urbanization* 24.1 (2012): 47-57.
- Brand, Richard R. “The role of cocoa in the growth and spatial organization of Accra (Ghana) prior to 1921.” *African Studies Review* (1972): 271-282.
- Chalfin, Brenda. “Public things, excremental politics, and the infrastructure of bare life in Ghana’s city of Tema.” *American ethnologist* 41.1 (2014): 92-109.
- Chambas, Mohammed Ibn. 1979. “Leadership and Policies in Nima, A Slum Community in Accra.” M.A. Thesis, University of Ghana.
- Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona N. Golder. “The British Academy Brian Barry Prize Essay: An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics.” *British Journal of Political Science* (2017): 1-30.
- Dakubu, Mary Esther Kropp. *Korle meets the sea: A sociolinguistic history of Accra*. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1997.
- Daniell, William F. “On the Ethnography of Akkrah and Adampe, Gold Coast, Western Africa.” *Journal of the Ethnological Society of London (1848-1856)* 4 (1856): 1-32.
- Davis, Mike. *Planet of Slums*. London & New York: Verso, 2006.
- Dickson, Kwamina B. *A historical geography of Ghana*. CUP Archive, 1969.
- Di John, Jonathan, and James Putzel. “Political settlements: Issues paper.” (2009).
- Dikeç, Mustafa. “Justice and the spatial imagination.” *Environment and Planning A* 33.10 (2001): 1785-1805.
- Dima, Bogdan, Nuno Carlos Leitao, and Stefana Dima. “Urbanization and democracy in the framework of modernization theory: recent empirical evidences.” *Actual problems of Economics* (2011): 390-398.
- Dowding, Keith, et al. “Exit, voice and loyalty: Analytic and empirica developments.” *European Journal of Political Research* 37.4 (2000): 469-495.
- Duneier, Mitchell. *Ghetto: The invention of a place, the history of an idea*. Macmillan, 2016.
- Ejdemyr, Simon, Eric Kramon, and Amanda Lea Robinson. “Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Local Public Goods.” *Working Paper*, 2015.
- Epstein, David L., et al. “Democratic transitions.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50.3 (2006): 551-569.
- Field, Margaret Joyce. *Religion and medicine of the Ga people*. Oxford University Press, 1937.
- Fox, Sean. “The political economy of slums: Theory and evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.” *World Development* 54 (2014): 191-203.
- Friedmann, John. “Where we stand: a decade of world city research.” *World cities in a world-system* 25 (1995).
- Fridy, Kevin S., and Victor Brobbey. “Win the match and vote for me: the politicisation of Ghana’s Accra Hearts of Oak and Kumasi Asante Kotoko football clubs.” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 47.01 (2009): 19-39.
- Gehlbach, Scott. “A formal model of exit and voice.” *Rationality and Society* 18.4 (2006): 395-418.
- Goodfellow, Tom. “Rwanda’s political settlement and the urban transition: expropriation, construction and taxation in Kigali.” *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8.2 (2014): 311-329.

- Grant, Richard. "Out of place? Global citizens in local spaces: a study of the informal settlements in the Korle Lagoon environs in Accra, Ghana." *Urban Forum*. Vol. 17. No. 1. Springer Netherlands, 2006.
- Grant, Richard. *Globalizing city: The urban and economic transformation of Accra, Ghana*. Syracuse University Press, 2009.
- Green, Elliott. "Explaining African ethnic diversity." *International Political Science Review* 34.3 (2013): 235-253.
- Gulyani, Sumila, and Ellen M. Bassett. "Retrieving the baby from the bathwater: slum upgrading in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 25.4 (2007): 486-515.
- Habermas, Jürgen. *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*. MIT press, 1991.
- Harvey, David. *The new imperialism*. Oxford University Press, USA, 2003.
- Harvey, David. *Rebel cities: From the right to the city to the urban revolution*. Verso Books, 2012.
- Hirschman, Albert O. *Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*. Vol. 25. Harvard university press, 1970.
- Hodge, Peter. "The Ghana workers brigade: a project for unemployed youth." *The British Journal of Sociology* 15.2 (1964): 113-128.
- Honig, Lauren. "Immigrant Political Economies and Exclusionary Policy in Africa." *Comparative Politics* 48.4 (2016): 517-537.
- Holston, James. *Cities and citizenship*. Duke University Press, 1999.
- Huchzermeyer, Marie. *Cities with slums: From informal settlement eradication to a right to the city in Africa*. Juta Academic, 2011.
- Ichino, Nahomi, and Noah L. Nathan. "Democratizing the Party: The Effects of Primary Election Reforms in Ghana." (2016).
- Inglehart, Ronald. *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Kasara, Kimuli. "Separate and suspicious: Local social and political context and ethnic tolerance in Kenya." *The Journal of Politics* 75.4 (2013): 921-936.
- Klaus, Kathleen and Jeffrey W. Paller. 2016. "Strategies of Political Mobilization in Urban Ghana." Working Paper.
- Koter, Dominika. "Urban and rural voting patterns in Senegal: the spatial aspects of incumbency, c. 1978–2012." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 51.04 (2013): 653-679.
- Kobo, Ousman. "'We are citizens too': the politics of citizenship in independent Ghana." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* (2010): 67-94.
- Konadu-Agyemang, Kwadwo O. "Reflections on the absence of squatter settlements in West African cities: the case of Kumasi, Ghana." *Urban Studies* 28.1 (1991): 139-151.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53.01 (1959): 69-105.
- Lombard, Melanie, and C. Rakodi. "Urban land and conflict in the global south." *Urban Studies* 53.13 (2016): 2683-2699.
- Lyons, William E., David Lowery, and Ruth Hoogland DeHoog. *The politics of dissatisfaction: Citizens, services, and urban institutions*. ME Sharpe, 1992.
- Mabogunje, Akin L. *Regional mobility and resource development in West Africa*. McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 1972.

- Maier, Donna. "Competition for Power and Profits in Kete-Krachi, West Africa, 1875-1900." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 13.1 (1980): 33-50.
- Mamdani, Mahmood. *Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism*. Princeton University Press, 1996.
- Marx, Benjamin, Thomas Stoker, and Tavneet Suri. "The economics of slums in the developing world." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 27.4 (2013): 187-210.
- Matland, Richard E. "Synthesizing the implementation literature: The ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation." *Journal of public administration research and theory* 5.2 (1995): 145-174.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. "Dynamics of Contention, 2001." *Part of Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics* (2007): 121.
- McAuslan, Patrick. *Bringing the law back in: essays in land, law, and development*. Gower Publishing, Ltd., 2003.
- McPhee, Allan. *The Economic Revolution in British West Africa*. Vol. 106. Psychology Press, 1926.
- Nathan, Noah L. "Local ethnic geography, expectations of favoritism, and voting in urban Ghana." *Comparative Political Studies* 49.14 (2016a): 1896-1929.
- Nathan, Noah L. "Does Participation Reinforce Patronage? Policy Preferences, Turnout, and Class in Urban Ghana." *Forthcoming, British Journal of Political Science* (2016b).
- Ntewusu, Samuel Aniegye. *Settling in and holding on: a socio-economic history of northern traders and transporters in Accra's Tudu: 1908-2008*. Diss. Institute for History, Faculty of Humanities, Leiden University, 2011.
- Obeng-Odoom, Franklin. "'Abnormal' Urbanization in Africa: A Dissenting View." *African Geographical Review* 29.2 (2010).
- Onoma, Ato Kwamena. *The politics of property rights institutions in Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Ozanne, Paul. "Notes on the early historic archaeology of Accra." *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 6 (1962): 51-70.
- Paller, Jeffrey W. "Informal institutions and personal rule in urban Ghana." *African Studies Review* 57.03 (2014): 123-142.
- Paller, Jeffrey W. *African slums: constructing democracy in unexpected places*. Diss. The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2014b.
- Paller, Jeffrey W. "Informal networks and access to power to obtain housing in urban slums in Ghana." *Africa Today* 62.1 (2015): 30-55.
- Parker, John. *Making the town: Ga state and society in early colonial Accra*. Pearson Education Ltd, 2000.
- Parnell, Susan and Edgar Pieterse, eds. 2014. *Africa's Urban Revolution*. London: Zed Books.
- Payne, Geoffrey. "Urban land tenure policy options: Titles or rights?." *Habitat International* 25.3 (2001): 415-429.
- Peil, Margaret. "The expulsion of West African aliens." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 9.02 (1971): 205-229.
- Peil, Margaret. "Ghana's aliens." *The International Migration Review* 8.3 (1974): 367-381.
- Peil, Margaret. "African squatter settlements: a comparative study." *Urban Studies* 13.2 (1976): 155-166.
- Pellow, Deborah. "Migrant Communities in Accra: Marginalizing the Margins." *Globalization and the Margins*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. 111-129.

- Pogucki, R. J. H. *Gold Coast Land Tenure Volume I: A Survey of Land Tenure in Customary Law of the Protectorate of the Northern Territories*. 1955.
- Purcell, Mark. "Citizenship and the right to the global city: reimagining the capitalist world order." *International journal of urban and regional research* 27.3 (2003): 564-590.
- Rakodi, Carole. "Addressing gendered inequalities in access to land and housing." *Gender, Asset Accumulation and Just Cities: Pathways to Transformation* (2015): 81.
- Quarcoopome, Samuel S. "Urbanisation, land alienation and politics in Accra." *Institute of African studies Research review* 8.1-2 (1992): 40-54.
- Quarcoopome, Samuel S. "A history of the urban development of Accra: 1877-1957." *Research Review* 9.1-2 (1993): 20-32.
- Rathbone, Richard. *Nkrumah & the chiefs: the politics of chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951-60*. Ohio State University Press, 2000.
- Reindorf, Carl Christian. *The History of the Gold Coast and Asante... Reprinted*. Ghana University Press; London: Oxford University Press, 1966.
- Robinson, Amanda Lea. "National versus ethnic identification in Africa: Modernization, colonial legacy, and the origins of territorial nationalism." *World Politics* 66.04 (2014): 709-746.
- Rouch, Jean. "Migrations au Ghana." *Journal de la Société des Africanistes* 26.1 (1956): 33-196.
- Roy, Ananya. "Strangely familiar: Planning and the worlds of insurgence and informality." *Planning Theory* 8.1 (2009): 7-11.
- Sackeyfio-Lenoch, Naaborko. *The Politics of Chieftaincy: Authority and Property in Colonial Ghana, 1920-1950*. Vol. 61. Boydell & Brewer, 2014.
- Severino, Jean-Michel, and Olivier Ray. *Africa's moment*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011.
- Souza, Celina. "Participatory budgeting in Brazilian cities: limits and possibilities in building democratic institutions." *Environment and Urbanization* 13.1 (2001): 159-184.
- Stacey, Paul, and Christian Lund. "In a state of slum: governance in an informal urban settlement in Ghana." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 54.4 (2016).
- Staeheli, Lynn A. "Cities and citizenship." *Urban Geography* 24.2 (2003): 97-102.
- Tarrow, Sidney. "The strategy of paired comparison: Toward a theory of practice." *Comparative Political Studies* 43.2 (2010): 230-259.
- Tilly, Charles. *Durable inequality*. Univ of California Press, 1998.
- Van Leeuwen, Mathijs, and Gemma Van Der Haar. "Theorizing the land-violent conflict nexus." *World Development* 78 (2016): 94-104.
- Wallace, Jeremy. "Cities, redistribution, and authoritarian regime survival." *The Journal of Politics* 75.3 (2013): 632-645.
- Wilks, Ivor. "The rise of the Akwamu empire, 1650-1710." *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana* 3.2 (1957): 25-62.
- Yakah, Theophilus A. 2016. The Rise of 'Ethnic Parties' in Africa: the Case of Ghana. *Working paper*.